End of War, End of Empires: The Spread of the Post-colonial movement in Africa and Asia

Lecture 10: End of War, End of Empires: The Spread of the Post-colonial movement in Africa and Asia

Decolonization of Asian and African areas in the early phases of the Cold War. The Non-Aligned Movement (1961), the Group of 77 (1964). The Growth of Soviet-funded and Chinese- funded armed groups in Africa (from the 1960s).

The reasons why decolonization took place are many and complex, varying widely from one country to another. Three key elements played a major role in the process: colonized peoples' thirst for independence, the Second World War which demonstrated that colonial powers were no longer invulnerable, and a new focus on anti-colonialism in international arenas such as the United Nations. The end of the colonial empires was not caused by the Cold War, but new nations became entangled in the dispute between East and West. The Cold War and decolonization created a Three World order. The First World was the US and its liberal democratic, capitalist allies, the Second World was the USSR and its communist allies, and the new, decolonized nations formed the Third World. In this lesson, students will learn about the efforts of the US and the Soviet Union to influence the Third World and the attempt of leaders in the Third World to create a “Third Way” that would be independent of both superpowers.

They will analyze two conflicts – the Suez Canal Crisis of 1956 and the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1961 – to understand how Third World leaders tried to shape a Third Way amid the pressures of the Cold War.

Colonial world dominance in 1939. Before the Second World War broke out, a large proportion of the world population was living under the sovereignty of a colonial power, for the most part European. European domination in Africa was particularly impressive. 

World War II undermines the colonial system. Myths such as the invulnerability of colonial powers and white supremacy were seriously challenged by the outbreak of the Second World War.

Accelerated decolonization after 1945. Following the Second World War, the colonial system was subject to growing unrest and many countries quickly acquired their independence.

Independence for India and Pakistan. Clement Attlee, the Labor Prime Minister who replaced Winston Churchill in July 1945, soon realized that independence for India was inevitable, but disagreements among the Indian politicians made the negotiations very difficult.

 Independence for Burma, Ceylon and Malaysia. Burma and Ceylon (later Sri Lanka) obtained their independence soon after India but, in Malaysia, the situation was more complex.

 Independence for the Indonesian Archipelago. A direct consequence of Japanese occupation of the Dutch East Indies during the Second World War was the emergence of Indonesian nationalism. Nevertheless, at the end of the war, the Netherlands was opposed to independence.

Independence for Indochina. The Communist Party led by Ho Chi Minh took advantage of the Japanese occupation of Indochina during the Second World War to launch the Viet Minh Independence Movement. The failure to create an Indochinese federation in 1946 as part of the French Union led to a long war of independence.

Independence for Italy’s African colonies. Independence for Italy’s African colonies (Ethiopia, Libya, Eritrea, Somalia) came as a direct consequence of Italy’s downfall during the Second World War.

Decolonization of the United Kingdom’s territories in Africa. In Africa, the United Kingdom launched the process of decolonization in the early 1950s. Some countries achieved independence peacefully. Others, however, became embroiled in inter-community rivalries or faced with opposition from the British colonial settlers.

 Decolonization of North Africa by France. French North Africa covered three territories: the Protectorates of Morocco in the west and Tunisia in the East, with Algeria in the centre. Algeria was considered by France to be an extension of its national territory and only obtained its independence after a long drawn-out conflict lasting 8 years.

Decolonization of French black Africa. Independence in Africa was introduced in phases. Most of the French colonies in Black Africa became independent in 1960.

Independence for Belgium’s African colonies. The immense Belgian Congo was one of the richest colonies in Africa. After bloody riots in 1959, the Belgian Government quickly yielded to demands for independence in 1960.

Independence for Portugal’s African colonies. Portuguese colonies in Africa gained their independence only after the “Carnation Revolution” which took place in Lisbon in April 1974.

Independence for Spain’s African territories

Spain had few colonies on the African continent. North of Morocco, Spanish Guinea and Western Sahara gained their independence from Spain during the period 1956 to 1975.

Comparison of Decolonization in India and Africa After World War II

In comparing the patterns and results of decolonization of India and Africa, there are many similarities and differences. The decolonization movement gained strength after WWII in both India and Africa because of the war's weakening of the colonizing European countries' economies, as well as rising nationalism in India and Africa. Also, both Africa and India suffered splits between populations within the same colony after decolonization. This was because of ethnic and religious differences among populations of the colonies. However, Africa and India were different in their political structures after decolonization. This was because of the desire of these African nations to protect and gain valuable resources, as well as the desire of the Hindus of India to gain political power and of the rulers of the nations of Africa to remain in power.

After World War II, the colonizing nations of Europe, including Britain and France, became weaker due to the war's negative impact on their economies and military. This meant they had less funding to run bureaucracies in their colonies, and were reluctant to make military commitment to suppress revolts in their colonies. Because of WWII's drain on their economies, the European nations wanted to take even larger advantage of their colonies, taking more of the colonies' valuable resources, and paying even less for them. This furthered nationalistic beliefs because it greatly upset local elites, who owned most of these resources and were not receiving adequate pay for them. Europe's struggling economy meant it couldn't pay African workers decent wages to work for them, so instead Europeans forced Africans into labor for them. When the government of French Equatorial Africa decided to build a railroad from Brazzaville to the Atlantic Coast, it drafted 127,000 men to carve a roadbed across mountains and through rainforests. Lacking food, clothing, and medical care, 20,000 of them died. Events such as this contributed to rising nationalism in Africa. Also, during WWII, many people from Africa and India went to Europe to help in the war effort. Between the years of 1939 and 1945, over a million Africans served in World War II. Upon arriving and seeing the European nations in their weakened state, they no longer saw Europeans as dominant economically, militarily, or culturally. The weakness of the European countries and growing nationalism in India and Africa, due to their new views of Europe, combined to help India reach decolonization in 1947 and the nations of Africa to reach decolonization in and after the 1950s. This included Ghana's independence in 1957, Nigeria's in 1960, and Algeria's in 1962.

When the Europeans split up Africa into different colonies, they did so to further their own agenda, and ignored the fact that they were separating and mixing peoples of different ethnicities and religions. After independence, African countries were responsible for governing themselves, and many tribes didn't want to be part of nations composed of peoples of different ethnicities and religions. One example of this was the religious conflict between Muslims and Christians in Nigeria. Also, tribes within these nations didn't want to have a centralized democratic African government because some regions had valuable natural resources, while others did not. For this reason, tribes in regions with valuable natural resources didn't want to share these resources with the rest of their nation through the central government, and would attempt to split off from the nation instead. As a result, many nations of Africa became dictatorial military governments, so that the government would have enough power to force tribes to stay within the nation, and to compel people to give up their wealth. Another reason for some of the dictatorial governments in Africa was due to the fact that European settlers of these nations wanted to remain in power. Unlike in India, where Hindus used democracy to gain political power because they were a majority, these settlers, being an extreme minority, could not rely on democracy to remain in power. Instead, these settlers instituted dictatorships to remain in power. One example of this is in Zimbabwe, which was run by whites. Similarly, after South Africa won independence from Britain in 1931, the ruling British and Dutch colonists established a system of apartheid as an all-encompassing way of dividing blacks, who were 80% of the population, from the white minority. The worst areas of the country, compromising less than 15% of the nation's land, were set aside for blacks. The whites were given the cities, the resource-rich mines, and the best farmland. Blacks who stayed in the cities were segregated into black slums.

By the time India received independence, conflict between Hindus and Muslims had become so intense that Muslims broke off and formed their own nation, Pakistan. This was followed by genocide of Muslims in India, as well as genocide of Hindus in Pakistan. Within a few months, some twelve million people had abandoned their homes and a half-million lay dead. Before the break, Muslims had a lot of political power, as they were the elites in India. However, when receiving independence, India declared its government would be a democracy, unlike in Africa, where many nations were governed by dictatorships. This was decided because the majority of India was Hindu, and Hindus knew they would gain control of India's government if they used a democracy. However, as a minority, constituting only a quarter of the people of India, the Muslims would lose most of their political power in a democratic government, and so they decided to split off and form their own nation. This was similar to the attempts of many tribes of Africa to split off from their nations, because of ethnic and religious differences as well as their unwillingness to share valuable resources.

Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), international organization dedicated to representing the interests and aspirations of developing countries. The Non-Aligned Movement counts more than 100 member states, whose combined population amounts to more than half of the world’s population

The Non-Aligned Movement emerged in the context of the wave of decolonization that followed World War II. At the 1955 Bandung Conference (the Asian-African Conference), the conference’s attendees, many of whose countries had recently gained their independence, called for “abstention from the use of arrangements of collective defence to serve the particular interests of any of the big powers.” In the context of the Cold War, they argued, countries of the developing world should abstain from allying with one of the two superpowers (the United States and the U.S.S.R.) and should instead join in support of national self-determination against all forms of colonialism and imperialism. The Non-Aligned Movement was founded and held its first conference (the Belgrade Conference) in 1961 under the leadership of Josip Broz Tito of Yugoslavia, Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt, Jawaharlal Nehru of India, Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, and Sukarno of Indonesia.

As a condition for membership, the states of the Non-Aligned Movement cannot be part of a multilateral military alliance (such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization) or have signed a bilateral military agreement with one of the “big powers” if it was “deliberately concluded in the context of Great Power conflicts.” However, the idea of nonalignment does not signify that a state ought to remain passive or even neutral in international politics. On the contrary, from the founding of the Non-Aligned Movement, its stated aim has been to give a voice to developing countries and to encourage their concerted action in world affairs.

Unlike the United Nations (UN) or the Organization of American States, the Non-Aligned Movement has no formal constitution or permanent secretariat. All members of the Non-Aligned Movement have equal weight within its organization. The movement’s positions are reached by consensus in the Summit Conference of Heads of State or Government, which, by convention, convenes every three years. The administration of the organization is the responsibility of the country holding the chair, a position that rotates at every summit. The ministers of foreign affairs of the member states meet more regularly in order to discuss common challenges, notably at the opening of each regular session of the UN General Assembly.

One of the challenges of the Non-Aligned Movement in the 21st century has been to reassess its identity and purpose in the post-Cold War era. The movement has continued to advocate for international cooperation, multilateralism, and national self-determination, but it has also been increasingly vocal against the inequities of the world economic order.

The Group of 77 at the United Nations is a loose coalition of developing nations, designed to promote its members' collective economic interests and create an enhanced joint negotiating capacity in the United Nations. There were 77 founding members of the organization, but by November 2013 the organization had since expanded to 134 member countries.

South Africa holds the Chairmanship for 2015. The group was founded on June 15, 1964, by the "Joint Declaration of the Seventy-Seven Countries" issued at the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). The first major meeting was in Algiers in 1967, where the Charter of Algiers was adopted and the basis for permanent institutional structures was begun. There are Chapters of the Group of 77 in Rome (FAO), Vienna (UNIDO), Paris (UNESCO), Nairobi (UNEP) and the Group of 24 in Washington, D.C. (International Monetary Fund and World Bank).

Soviet-funded and Chinese- funded armed groups in Africa (from the 1960s).

Trends in Soviet Support for African Liberation

The Soviet Union was one of the most important sources of aid for African nationalist guerrilla movements involved in “liberation struggles” against Africa’s white regimes. Since Western governments have refused significant support to these movements, the Soviets—by extending material aid—have maneuvered them into a position which appears to condone the white regimes of Africa and which thus opens them to attack from Third World countries. African guerrilla movements appear high on the list of candidates for substantially increased Soviet support. The purpose of this article is to examine general Soviet policy toward the various African liberation groups that have emerged during the last decade. Two main ideas will be discussed: the historical basis for Soviet support of “national liberation,” in general; and examples of Soviet involvement with specific African movements. Contemporary African movements will be identified with regard to Soviet support. The bulk of the study will involve the Soviet decision to back these contemporary movements, the relative importance of this Soviet aid, Moscow’s policy toward individual groups, and finally Sino-Soviet competition for the allegiance of the various groups.

historical development

Communist support for national liberation movements is older than the Soviet state. Marx and Engels sympathized with most of the revolutionary and national emancipation movements of their day. Soviet responsibility to foreign liberation struggles was recognized early in the history of the state, but Africa tended to be viewed in terms of European colonialism or not at all. Black Africa did not become a serious concern of Soviet foreign policy until the late 1950s. For the first forty years of Soviet history—a period often marked by sweeping revolutionary expectations—Africa stood on the outermost edge of Soviet consciousness.1 Early party conventions paid lip service to the cause of the nonwhite world but primarily as a consequence of anti-colonialism.

A pronounced change from the previous Soviet policy of African noninvolvement occurred in the late 1950s and early 1960s as the tide of nationalism swept most textbook colonialism out of Africa. The de-colonization process appeared to Russian observers as damaging to the West and therefore beneficial to World Communism—if it could be properly exploited. Both the Soviets and the Chinese stressed that wars of national liberation were in fact aspects of the world revolution against imperialism.2

Khrushchev more than any other figure shifted emphasis to the Third World and to Africa—what he called the underdeveloped third of mankind. He saw the retreat of colonialism as a decisive opportunity to weaken the West in the era of cold war tension and nuclear stalemate. It was in the Khrushchev period that the concept of wars of national liberation was popularized. It is not difficult to see a relationship between this phenomenon and changing Soviet policy toward involvement with African nationalist movements.

practicality of African liberation

After the wave of independence broke on the African continent in the early 1960s, Soviet policy-makers had to decide whether the remaining nationalist movements were worth supporting. This required a hard look at their chances for success and at the political value of merely giving them support. As these movements emerged in the early sixties, the Soviets seemed to have no definitive policy. In 1962, for example, Soviet writers praised various nationalist movements in Mozambique that later merged to form the Mozambique Liberation Front.3 Despite favorable commentary, it seems the Soviets were confused by the prospect of having to support multiple liberation groups, sometimes within one country. Having made little headway with newly independent states, somewhere in the mid or late sixties the Soviets resigned themselves to playing a supporting role in helping those territories yet to be “liberated,” particularly the Portuguese territories.

Whether the U.S.S.R. really believed in the ultimate success of the movements is open to speculation. It is probable, however, that the Soviets saw more in these movements than the prospects of independent pro-Soviet states. Because of their initial clumsiness in Africa, the Soviets were widely regarded with suspicion. Support for the liberation groups then became an opening that could gain them some respectability in African eyes and at the same time damage the West. At the very least the Soviets could not be called allies of the colonial/imperialist powers. Furthermore, the main Soviet goal in Africa may not have been to establish pro-Communist regimes but rather to exploit the rift between African elites and the West. This would have the effect of keeping Africa a source of division, conflict, and ultimate danger.4 This more modest goal may well underlie Soviet aid programs for the guerrilla forces.

African liberation movements have identity problems stemming from their lack of exposure and the general lack of importance attached to them outside Africa. In the Third World, there has been extensive acceptance of the African movements. The Soviet Union has supported many of these organizations in the last decade. All are relatively small, and they seek ultimately to wrest control of their respective homelands from white-controlled governments. All have turned to violence in some form, some founding active insurgencies. In most cases it is politically convenient for the Soviets to extend at least verbal support.

The fact that the Soviets assist African liberation movements is widely known. Writers during the sixties warned of Communist training for subversive cadres to be used in Africa. Despite these warnings, the success of the guerrilla movements themselves does not seem to have been a prime motivating factor. The Russians realized, however, that they could get a maximum political return on a minimal investment.5 By aiding the cause of African liberation against the “evils of racism” in southern Africa, they saw the opportunity to score a propaganda coup. One might even speculate as to whether Moscow has wanted the insurgents to triumph and terminate this advantageous situation for one of uncertainty. Or on the other hand, whether the movements themselves are really seeking self-perpetuation above all else.

significance of Soviet aid

The value of Soviet backing for the various movements is great, and thus the way is clear for Moscow to exert its influence on them and extract what it can in fringe benefits. This situation, advantageous to the Soviets, leaves the movements open to verbal attack from their enemies. Training is perhaps the most important form of aid for both the donor and recipient. For the movements, the learning of techniques is more pertinent to their situation than receiving equipment. For the Soviets, training offers their best opportunity to indoctrinate the potential cadre. Formal instruction in guerrilla strategy and tactics has been the most fruitful method for transmitting Communist ideas on guerrilla warfare. Virtually every major African guerrilla movement has sent selected recruits to the Soviet Union and other Communist states for intensive training.

The type of training administered by the Soviets was recently outlined to a journalist by two ex-guerrillas in Mozambique. The first studied political warfare at the Central Komsomol School in Moscow during 1966-67. The principal subjects were political science and economics, the history of Communism, and laws of nature. Students at the school came from several African states. This guerrilla was selected for advanced study in political subversion, including how to carry out a coup d’йtat and how to subvert an army. The second former guerrilla was sent to Moscow in 1965 and was later sent to a ten-month course at the Guerrilla Warfare Training School in the Crimea. The training was in guerilla tactics and weapons, with periods of political teachings. All the students were African. These are just two of the many Africans (estimated in the hundreds) that undergo training in Moscow and the Crimea each year.7 Training and indoctrination continue to be a vital part of the overall Soviet policy toward the liberation movements.

Cuban training assistance may be in collaboration with Soviet efforts. The Cubans did much to popularize guerrilla warfare. Cuban policy has strongly supported revolutionary causes in Africa, and Cuban academies with Communist/revolutionary themes are reported to train over 700 students from black Africa at a time.

The Africans, the Russians, and

The Organization of African Unity

Most guerrilla leaders view the aid they receive from the Soviets as Moscow’s duty in its role as leader of socialist nations. At the same time they remain sensitive to being identified with Communism. Amilcar Cabral, the late guerrilla leader from Portuguese Guinea has stated that the aid his group receives from the socialist countries is a historical obligation. Agostinho Neto, the Angolan revolutionary leader, maintains that his organization is not subordinate in its policy to any foreign power and that any statements to the contrary are propagandistic fantasy. He states that people fighting for their independence will take aid from wherever they can, even from the Devil himself.

The Organization of African Unity (OAU), through its African Liberation Committee (ALC), has sought to be the chief vehicle for aiding and influencing the movements. Most of the funds for the movements is channeled through the ALC, which has tended to function more as a political organization. OAU/ALC recognition is important to the movements, but it is secondary in overall importance to Soviet support. According to Cabral, the OAU responded to his requests for weapons and supplies, but quantities were insufficient to meet his needs. Cabral’s strongest thanks were reserved for the U.S.S.R. The OAU/ALC, being weak in resources, cannot carry as much weight as the Soviets when it comes to material assistance, but it remains a respectable showcase for the voices of African liberation free from the tinge of Communism.

relations with individual movements

The more significant bilateral relations are those with the movements of Portuguese Africa. These groups are the most viable of the African liberation movements and are the beneficiaries of the most Soviet attention. Largely through Soviet efforts, these organizations were grouped into the Conference of Nationalist Parties of the Portuguese Colonies (CONCP). The members of CONCP are PAIGC (Portuguese Guinea), MPLA (Angola), and FRELIMO (Mozambique). It is the writer’s opinion that the CONCP may be seen as the Soviets’ attempt to centralize their control over these movements, to increase their propaganda impact.

In 1962 the Soviets described the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC) as a progressive nationalist organization. They claimed that PAIGC guerrilla fighters obtained their weapons by taking them away from the Portuguese, indicating the Soviets were not supplying arms at this time or at least were not publicizing it. By the end of the year it was reported that the PAIGC had secured significant international support in Africa and, more important, from the Soviet Union. According to more recent reports, not only have the Soviets provided material assistance, training facilities, and diplomatic support but this contribution has constituted the largest single amount of aid given to the PAIGC.

The PAIGC now depends on the Soviets for everything from rocket launchers to pencils. Consequently, the PAIGC duly supports the Soviet line. On the other hand, the Soviets have in the PAIGC their best investment among liberation movements in Africa. The PAIGC is generally regarded as the most effective movement, with the best chance of ultimate success. The PAIGC was the first African group to receive the Soviet-built SA-7, a portable heat-seeking surface-to-air missile. This weapon was introduced in Southeast Asia in 1972. The PAIGC is increasing its military efforts and in September 1973 declared its independence unilaterally.

The Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) is Moscow’s choice in Portuguese East Africa. FRELIMO is unique in that it also receives substantial support from the People’s Republic of China. FRELIMO President Samora Machel acknowledges assistance from both Moscow and Peking, describing them as “the only ones who will really help us. . . . They have fought armed struggles, and whatever they have learned that is relevant to Mozambique we will use.” These blunt statements by Machel reveal a great deal of pragmatism by this military man. Soviet support of FRELIMO’s armed struggle was expressed in 1972 with the delivery of 122-mm artillery rockets.

In Angola, Soviet aid was decisive in creating a viable movement, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA). Consequently, the MPLA follows the Soviet line more closely than the others.  This group, however, has not been as successful in the field. The MPLA, like many other movements of its type, experiences much internal turbulence and personnel turnover. Therefore, a shortage of trained military personnel does not necessarily mean that not enough have been trained. Aside from defections and desertions, combat losses must also be considered. The shortage of modem arms may not be of great significance. Often older weapons (small arms) provided by the Soviets are better suited for the conditions of guerrilla warfare in the tropics. They are more durable and are easier to maintain. Numerous weapons either are lost to the Portuguese in combat by poorly trained troops or are captured by security forces when guerrilla hideouts and arms caches are uncovered.

other Soviet-backed movements

In Rhodesia, where guerrilla activity has been sporadic, the Soviets back the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU), one of three current movements seeking to liberate Zimbabwe (Rhodesia). Following Rhodesia’s unilateral declaration of independence in November 1965, ZAPU was banned in Rhodesia and began operating in exile. ZAPU came under Soviet influence through its association with the strongly Soviet-oriented African National Congress (ANC) of South Africa, the two sharing their plight in exile. By the late 1960s dissident ZAPU students in Europe began contesting their movement’s Moscow orientation. They claimed ZAPU representatives abroad were puppets of “Soviet Revisionists” while their Chinese-backed rival, the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), was making progress because of its “impartial, loyal, strong, and disinterested allies.”13 The charges of the ZAPU students may have been justified because nearly all the credit for current guerrilla campaign in Rhodesia has gone to ZANU. At least in Rhodesia, it pears the Soviets are not backing the leading contender.

In Namibia (South-West Africa) guerrillas the South-West Africa People’s Organization (SWAPO) carry on very sporadic activity in the Caprivi Strip from bases across the border. Some SWAPO members are known to have been trained in the U.S.S.R., and Moscow has been a principal source material aid. SWAPO, like ZAPU in Rhodesia, is much smaller in size and in the scope of its operations than any of the CONCP movements. Although neither SWAPO nor ZAPU seems remotely near achieving success, at least in SWAPO the Soviets enjoy the luxury of supporting the only effective movement to carry on the semblance of an armed struggle in the country it hopes to liberate. Therefore, Moscow is the sole beneficiary of any credit given for the support of Namibian liberation.

The South African ANC has been supported by the Soviets but is perhaps overshadowed by the South African Communist Party (SACP). The Soviet-oriented SACP has been around for many years (it sent representatives to Moscow in 1921), but it was forced underground by the Suppression of Communism Act in 1950. It has the title and prestige of being the first African Communist party, and it maintains close contact with both Moscow and the ANC. Like the ANC, it is mainly in exile. The ANC, composed of black Africans while the SACP has many whites, is thought to have been responsible for the detonation of several propaganda pamphlet bombs in the Republic of South Africa over the past few years. Although the ANC has been unsuccessful in initiating insurgency in South Africa, that country’s racial policies make continued Soviet support for the movement necessary if the Soviets wish to exploit the situation.

dangers of world power involvement

The involvement of other world powers in the contemporary African liberation scene can only be a cause for concern in Moscow. Thus far it appears that competition with Communist China for the allegiance of the various movements is the chief threat to Soviet policy objectives. The West has not sought involvement in this arena. The Western powers have not taken any direct action to underwrite substantially the position of the white states fighting against the African nationalist movements, despite their self-professed importance to the West as bulwarks against the tide of Communism; and the West has done even less for the liberation forces. It might be argued that the West has not yet had to make a real decision on helping the staunchly anti-Communist white minority regimes because these regimes have not to date been seriously threatened by insurgency. Africa is probably also well down the list of priorities for all the major powers concerned.

The Soviets, as would any great power, face the danger of becoming too involved in these struggles. In certain circumstances, limited involvement has a spiraling effect: that is, the involvement of one great power in an East-West or Sino-Soviet rivalry has the effect of compelling its competitors to intervene. The danger would be greater if a power were propping up a government engulfed in insurgency. However, any situation where a great power’s prestige is on the line—even if backing the insurgents—has its inherent danger.

Sino-Soviet competition

As the 1950s gave birth to the popularity of guerilla warfare, Moscow and Peking became competitors for the leadership of world revolution. The Soviets believed they had to make up for the prestige China had gained as a result of the global recognition given to Mao Tse-tung’s revolutionary theories. They wanted to refocus attention on Moscow as the leader of world revolution. Both nations began using the means at their disposal in the search for influence in the Third World.

In general, the Soviet Union has supported the larger and more prestigious liberation groups, while China has backed the also-rans. This was mainly because the Soviets saw the inherent foreign policy advantages before the Chinese did and also because they were in a better economic position to do so. The various African movements currently receive Soviet and Chinese support as follows:

The Sino-Soviet rivalry is perhaps most apparent in aid programs for FRELIMO. The Chinese attempt to undermine Soviet influence through grassroots programs at FRELIMO training camps in Tanzania. The Soviets counter by using their superior resources to provide better weapons, equipment, and training abroad. The challenge to Soviet influence in FRELIMO may be partially explained by the large Chinese presence in Tanzania, where FRELIMO has much of its infrastructure. Peking may also be using FRELIMO as a test case to determine the Soviet response.

Race is an obstacle the Soviets face in their efforts to combat Chinese influence. The Chinese claim that Moscow is not qualified to guide the African movements because Russia is traditionally a European power. The inference here is that, while Russia has been a white European power not far removed from the despised colonial powers, China herself has been a victim of European colonialism. The Soviets recognize the race factor as potentially dangerous to their position, and it may cause them to be more ready with aid when they think it necessary to counter Chinese efforts.

the outlook

The outlook for continuing Sino-Soviet rivalry will depend on Moscow’s desire to meet China’s challenge. Since the late sixties Chinese aid to the liberation movements has increased significantly. Some observers believe competition between the Communist powers is likely to expand the sources of aid available to the insurgent movements in the future. Chinese power in the coming decades will probably continue to grow, and this will allow Peking to become more actively involved with African guerrilla movements and to encourage African militancy at the expense of the U.S.S.R.’s professed leadership of the international Communist movement.

Soviet motivation is based on several factors, only one of which aims to help the African liberation movements achieve their goal of independence. In fact, this factor seems to be overshadowed by other considerations; namely, exerting influence over the movements for propaganda purposes, keeping Africa in turmoil to upset the West, and countering Chinese attempts to supplant the Soviets as patriarch of the revolutionaries.

The consequences of continued, and perhaps growing, Sino-Soviet involvement are serious aspects of the problem. At the United Nations Conference on African Liberation held at Oslo, Norway, in April 1973, both the Soviet Union and China strongly voiced their support for the struggle. Aside from the normal verbal praise, the Soviets, in particular, proudly cited their material assistance to the movements and their desire to increase this aid.

The discovery of new Soviet weapons in hands of African guerrillas, such as 122-mm rocket and SA- 7 missile of Vietnam fame, can only lead to speculation that we may be witnessing the beginning of a new era of increased Soviet aid these movements. If increased Soviet and/or Chinese assistance materializes in the coming decade, some of the movements will become more effective and progress to a point where their ultimate objectives will be within reach. Soviet policy will then take on new meaning for Africa and the West, as it will claim a place for Moscow at the independence celebrations as principal sponsor of several new African regimes.

End of War, End of Empires: The Spread of the Post-colonial movement in Africa and Asia